From: Industry-wide work rules and productivity: evidence from Argentine union contract data
Labor productivity specifications | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Individual working rules | Level | Growth | ||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
Displacement | -0.331 ‡ | -0.321 † | -0.488 † | -0.475 † |
(0.152) | (0.191) | (0.239) | (0.262) | |
After reforms | 2.130 ∗ | 2.129 ∗ | 1.052 † | 1.048 ∗ |
(0.350) | (0.197) | (0.515) | (0.269) | |
Displacement after reforms | 0.367 ∗ | 0.364 | 0.544 ‡ | 0.546 † |
(0.120) | (0.227) | (0.259) | (0.305) | |
F-test (p-value) | - | 0.000 | - | 0.000 |
Sargan test (p-value) | - | 0.209 | - | 0.330 |
Categories | -0.628 ∗ | -0.616 ∗ | -0.779 | -0.763 ∗ |
(0.162) | (0.185) | (0.465) | (0.246) | |
After reforms | 2.053 ∗ | 2.056 ∗ | 1.250 ‡ | 1.250 ∗ |
(0.404) | (0.209) | (0.573) | (0.285) | |
Categories after reforms | 0.340 † | 0.336 | 0.020 | 0.021 |
(0.177) | (0.224) | (0.412) | (0.302) | |
F-test (p-value) | - | 0.000 | - | 0.000 |
Sargan test (p-value) | - | 0.757 | - | 0.870 |
Technology | -0.195 | -0.192 | -0.421 | -0.415 |
(0.195) | (0.206) | (0.271) | (0.287) | |
After reforms | 1.863 ∗ | 1.860 ∗ | 0.776 | 0.767 ∗ |
(0.357) | (0.187) | (0.555) | (0.256) | |
Technology after reforms | 0.905 ∗ | 0.910 ∗ | 1.183 ‡ | 1.197 ∗ |
(0.243) | (0.254) | (0.438) | (0.351) | |
F-test (p-value) | - | 0.000 | - | 0.000 |
Sargan test (p-value) | - | 0.780 | - | 0.158 |
Training | -0.545 ‡ | -0.546 ∗ | -0.867 ∗ | -0.869 ∗ |
(0.223) | (0.211) | (0.278) | (0.291) | |
After reforms | 1.861 ∗ | 1.857 ∗ | 0.837 | 0.819 ∗ |
(0.364) | (0.199) | (0.521) | (0.270) | |
Training after reforms | 0.970 ∗ | 0.977 ∗ | 1.196 ∗ | 1.225 ∗ |
(0.215) | (0.280) | (0.305) | (0.383) | |
F-test (p-value) | - | 0.000 | - | 0.000 |
Sargan test (p-value) | - | 0.671 | - | 0.910 |
Basic and additional controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
State effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Number of observations | 1030 | 1030 | 899 | 899 |